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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not in practice.  As a 
result, United States policy is disjointed and conflictual between human rights and 
security.  The result is an inconsistency in foreign policy.  There have been examples of 
this throughout United States history.  Under the Carter Administration, the United States 
took steps to sever its relationships with the dictatorships of Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Ethiopia.  Yet, Carter maintained ties with other nations such as Iran, the Philippines, and 
Saudi Arabia.   The late Bush administration promoted democracy around the world but 
did little to promote it in key strategic partners such as Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia.1 
 The United States pursues such hypocritical policies because security and 
economic development are the primary policy priority.  Once these objectives are secured 
then the United States often pursues or includes human rights as part of its foreign 
policies in specific regions and states.  However, human rights cannot be placed in the 
back burner of foreign policy creation and implementation.  It must be included as a 
primary objective of United States policy along the other goals such as security.  
 Following the constructivist argument of international relations, the United States 
must perceive its security as pivotal to its existence.  Social factors mold the priorities of 
the United States.2  Therefore, due to the perceived importance of security, the United 
States prioritizes it in the creation and implementation of foreign policy.  Constructivism 
allows for change to occur in international relations.  Thus, in order to change foreign 
                                                        
1
 Gelb LH. The rise of ethics in foreign policy: Reaching a values consensus. Foreign Affairs. 
 2003;82(3):September 23, 2012-2-7.  Web site. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033574 
22
 Katzenstein P. Introduction: Alternative perspectives on national security. In: Katzenstein 
 P, ed. The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. West 
 Sussex, New York: Columbia University Press; 1996:1, 498. ISBN 0-231-10468-5.   
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policy and elevate the importance of human rights, United States perception of its 
priorities must change.  Human rights must be perceived as just as important as state 
security.  
 The U.S. policy toward El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain represent three 
examples of the conflictual policies of United States.  The three case studies highlight the 
timelessness of the issue.  They span the presidencies from the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 
current decade.  They serve as examples of cases when the United States prioritized 
security over human rights due to the perceived importance of security. 
 Several determining factors exist that decide a nation’s importance to the United 
States and thus the security driven initiatives that take precedence over human rights.  
These factors are the independent variables that determine why the United States acts the 
way it does currently and in the case studies mentioned above.  One factor that 
determines policy creation and implementation is the perceived threat level from other 
regional hegemons.  For example, in El Salvador it was the USSR; in Indonesia, it is 
China; in Bahrain it is Iran.  A second determining factor is military ties throughout 
history, a history of friendly relations that determine current decisions.  For example, the 
relationship with Indonesia goes far back to the Cold War and Bahrain’s close military 
ties since the Gulf War.   Thirdly, if another country shares the same enemy or same 
threat as the United States there is likely going to be a security tie between them.  For 
example, in El Salvador the threat was a communist take over; in Indonesia Al Qaeda and 
terrorism is a threat; in Bahrain, Iranian influence is a threat.  Therefore, the perceived 
importance of a country to the United States is the consistent factor in determining when 
security initiatives are prioritized over human rights. 
 3 
 The first section of the thesis will cover three case studies: El Salvador, Indonesia, 
and Bahrain.  Each case will 1) provide background information and a summary of 
human rights violations in order to provide context for the analysis, 2) list and explain the 
reasons why the United States prioritized security, and 3) analyze when human rights are 
absent and present in policy. Following a summary of the case studies, the next section 
will provide a series of recommendations in order to improve the conflictual policies of 
the United States.  
 4 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 During the Cold War, the constructivist theory of international relations emerged 
to account for the changing international setting that differed from traditional methods of 
interpreting security.  Realism was the predominant school of thought until the 
Copenhagen school emerged and dictated that changing norms and perceptions result in 
changing definition of security and thus changes in policies and state perception.   Ole 
Waever, Barry Buzan, and Peter Katzenstein are predominant constructivists who define 
security after the Cold War.  They call for a widening of the definition of security to 
include non-traditional elements such as human rights.   
 There is no standard definition of human rights.   Thus it is important to establish 
a definition of human rights that can be element of security policies.  The preamble of the 
Universal Declaration on human rights states that the “recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.3  It is followed by 30 detailed 
articles of human rights outlining the inherent human rights each individual has.  The 
scholars, Campbell and Jost Stellmacher also further define human rights in their articles. 
What are Human Rights? 
 Before establishing the different arguments of the application of human rights in 
an international setting, the definition of human rights must be more thoroughly 
examined.  Two sources establish different definitions of human rights. Tom Campbell 
concerns himself philosophically with the definition of human rights while Jost 
Stellmacher classifies different types of human rights. 
                                                        
3
 United Nations. The universal declaration of human rights. The United Nations Web site. 
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml 
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Rights: A Critical Introduction 
 Tom Campbell explores what constitutes rights and the different types of rights in 
his introductory philosophical book.  One of the main rights he discusses is human rights.  
He describes that everyone possesses human rights regardless of age, sex, race, ethnicity, 
religion, or any other method of distinguishing and sorting people.  He states that human 
rights take precedence over all other rights because of their inherit characteristics as 
belonging to all individuals.  One of the most fundamental characteristics of human 
rights, he describes, is their practicability.4  Human rights can be used in all societies and 
all people can abide by them regardless of where they are from in the world  
The Cognitive Representation of Human Rights: Knowledge, Importance, and 
Commitment 
 The above article, written by Jost Stellmacher, defines the two different types of 
human rights: civil and political rights; and economic, social, cultural rights.   The first 
category includes the following: the right to life, prohibition of torture and inhumane 
treatment, the right to freedom of opinion, and the right to political asylum.  The first 
category can be described as more fundamental than the second.  That is, the fist category 
prohibits murder, torture, and ensures personal freedoms.  The second category includes 
the right to work, protection against unemployment, the right to rest, and the right to a 
standard of living, the right to medical care, social security, and education.  This category 
ensures that people are not just provided the right to life but the right to flourish.  For 
                                                        
4
 Tom Campbell. The reputation of rights, varieties of rights, three human rights. In: David 
 Archard, ed. Rights A critical introduction 
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example, a person can work and provide for his or her family.  Thus,  a person is 
guaranteed food and shelter, education, and medical care.5 
Security and Human Rights 
 The place of human rights in security is widely debated.  Security can be defined 
narrowly to military terms and the use of force or widely to include other security sectors.  
Realism, liberalism, and constructivism argue for different perspectives of what a 
security threat is.  Constructivism allows for the most thorough definition for security and 
national interests due to its unique ability to allow for change in the perception of what 
defines threats.   
Rethinking Security After the Cold War 
 Barry Buzan writes about the changing notion of security after the Cold War.  
During the Cold War, security was defined strictly in military terms.6  It was narrowly 
focused and concerned itself primarily with war and the use of force.  Realism was the 
predominant school of thought.  However, following the Cold War the narrow focus and 
definition of security seemed irrelevant in a new world order.  Buzan theorizes that the 
state is less important in the new security agenda; it is still central but not a dominant 
force in defining security.7   The definition of security must be widened to include 
diversified threats such as human rights.   Barry Buzan structures his argument on the 
Copenhagen School framework.   Social norms and cultural phenomena dictate what is a 
                                                        
5
 Stellmacher J, Gert S, Elmar B. The cognitive representation of human rights: Knowledge, 
 importance, and commitment. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. 
 2005;11(3):September 27, 2012-267-92. Web site. 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327949pac1103_4#preview 
6
  Buzan B. Rethinking security after the cold war. Cooperation and Conflict. March 
 1997;32(1):2. Web site http://cac.sagepub.com/content/32/1/5.short 
7
 Buzan. "Rethinking Security After the Cold War." 13. 
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security threat.  It allows for changes in the perception of threats whereas realism is 
unable to account for such changes.  
The Culture of National Security 
 Edited by Peter Katzenstein, this book contains several chapters written by 
different intellectuals about the changing concept of national security and constructivism.  
The book claims that a constructivist view of international relations that have driven 
changes in social behavior, perception, and changing norms that account for changes in 
policy.8”  The book seeks to define what constitutes a state’s national interests through 
the constructivist paradigm.9   Katzenstein states that “security interests are defined by 
actors who respond to cultural factors”.10  He criticizes neoliberals and neorealists as 
being unable to account for change or to predict change.11   Instead, following 
constructivism, social determinants to security policy include the idea of the collective 
identity.12  State identities are a result of their interactions with the domestic and 
international environment.   Perceptions of the environment a state functions in change 
the perceptions of what threats are and therefore changes the undertaken policy.  In 
conclusion, Katzenstein argues for “broadening the field of security in two directions, 
encompassing nonmilitary issues. Concentrate on broader issues of…human 
rights…because such issues can have direct effects on the military intervention of 
states.”13  The author studies security in its traditional military focus but states that a 
                                                        
8
 Katzenstein, Peter, ed. The Culture of National Security: 1. 
9
 Katzenstein, 1. 
10
 Ibid., 13. 
11
 Ibid., 11. 
12
 Ibid., 22. 
13
 Ibid., 524. 
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widening of what constitutes a threat is important because of its capability to relate back 
to the traditional sense of security. 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis  
 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan collaborated in their book in order to redefine 
security.  The stated purpose of their book is to establish a new framework for security 
studies using constructivism.14  They question the traditional narrow focus of security on 
the military and use of force.15  Instead, they argue for a wider view of security issues to 
include non-traditional threats.  Waever and Buzan contend that defining security in non- 
traditional views is difficult but that “security is defined as perceived threats to anything 
such as the traditional view of a state to non-traditional views of threats” which include 
society, the environment, and economic laws.   Threats are divided into different sectors.  
The military sector of security concerns itself with the armed capabilities of a state.  The 
political sector concerns itself with the stability of a state.  The economic sector concerns 
itself with the ability to access resources and the market.  The societal sector concerns 
itself with the security and sustainability of language, culture, and customs.  The 
environmental sector concerns itself with the security of resources.16   Waever and Buzan 
conclude that there should be a multi-sectorial approach to security.  It is important to see 
the interconnectedness of different security threats across the different sectors.  
Evaluation 
 The fundamental issue of the existing literature is the extent of what constitutes a 
security threat.  Is security defined narrowly as only military threats and the use of force?  
                                                        
14
 Buzan B, Waever O, de Wilde J. Introduction, security analysis: Conceptual apparatus, the 
 military sector, the political sector. In: Security: A new framework for analysis. Colorado: 
 Lynne Reinner Publishers; 1998:1. ISBN 1-55587-603-X 
15
 Buzan, Waever. Security: A new framework for analysis. 2. 
16
 Ibid., 7. 
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Or is security defined widely to include non-traditional elements of security?  The realist 
paradigm concerns itself narrowly with traditional security concerns and the balance of 
power between states.  Constructivists such as Waever, Buzan, and Katzenstein define 
security threats more widely to include non-traditional threats such as the threat to human 
rights. Each scholar has contributed to the knowledge of international relations theories 
through the development of constructivism in the Copenhagen School of thought.   
  Katzenstein states that non-traditional threats can be intertwined with  traditional 
security threats.  For example, the threat to human rights is a threat to traditional security 
because of humanitarian intervention or the use of force to ensure human rights.  Buzan 
and Waever view security threats as belonging to different sectors.  A threat to human 
rights is a threat to the societal sector of security.  
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Chapter 3: El Salvador 
 In El Salvador, the United States not only privileged security over human rights, 
but it also strengthened the military that committed human rights abuses.  During the 
Cold War, security concerns took precedence over human rights due to the perceived 
importance of containing communism.   The United States pursued its military assistance 
in El Salvador despite the military’s abuse of power.  As the Cold War ended, human 
rights reemerged in United States foreign policy because of changing priorities.  The 
threat of communism dwindled, and with it the prioritization of securing an El Salvador 
without communist rule.   
Background Report 
 El Salvador’s civil war took place between 1980 and 1992.  The standing 
government of El Salvador and its military were financially backed by the United States 
against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN].  The funding that 
the Americans provided resulted in the military’s increased independence from the 
civilian government.17   Additionally, it made the government more reliant on the United 
States for assistance and the military less accountable towards its people.   
Human Rights Violations  
 Human rights violations by the Salvadoran military were rampant as a result of 
the decreased accountability towards its own government and citizens.  Throughout the 
                                                        
17
 Burgerman S. First do no harm: U.S. foreign policy and respect for human rights in El 
 Salvador and Guatemala, 1980-96. In: Implementing U.S. human rights policy. Liang-
 Fenton, Debra ed. Washington, D.C.: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace; 
 2004:269. ISBN 1-929223-49-8.  
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entire civil war over 75,000 civilians died.18  Between the years 1978 and1983, there 
were 42,171 deaths reported.19  Three infamous atrocities highlight the cruelty of the civil 
war.  The first event took place in 1980 and acted as the catalyst for the civil war.  
Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated because he wrote a letter to President Carter.  
He pleaded with the United States not to support the Salvadoran military and called for 
the military not to harm civilians.20  During the archbishop’s funeral, snipers shot and 
killed at least 42 of the mourners.21   The second incident took place in 1980, when four 
United States churchwomen were raped and murdered.  In the third incident, the 1989 
Jesuit Massacre, six Jesuit priests plus a housekeeper and her daughter were murdered.  
Each of these three incidents was an important moment within the conflict that altered 
foreign policy within the United States.  
Perceived Importance of El Salvador 
 Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of containing 
the spread of communism and curbing the USSR’s influence in El Salvador.  As a result, 
human rights policy was de-emphasized.  El Salvador’s Civil War took place during the 
Cold War, and the United States did not want El Salvador to fall under the communists’ 
sphere of influence.  Communism was a threat to American ideology and the idea of 
                                                        
18
 El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability: Bringing Human 
 Rights Abusers to Justice Web site. http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199. 
 Accessed September 23, 2012. 
19
 Stanley W. Introduction. In: The protection racket state: Elite politics, military extortion, and 
 civil war in el salvador. Philidalphia: Temple University Press; 1996: 3. ISBN 1-56639-
 391-4. 
20
 Doyle K, Willard E. Learn from history, 31st anniversary of the assassination of archbishop 
 oscar romero. The National Security Archive Web site. 
 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB339/index.htm. Updated 2011. 
 Accessed September 25, 2012. 
21
  El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability. 
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another state so close to America, influenced by the USSR, was perceived as a direct 
threat to American security.  United States policy contains traces of human rights 
concerns throughout the war, but vary in amount and influence over different time 
periods.  In the beginning and end of the war, human rights concerns are implemented 
into policy in addition to security policy.  But, during the middle of the war, security 
takes complete precedence despite attempts at implementing human rights. 
Human Rights Disregarded 
 The United States built its security commitment to El Salvador between 1981 and 
1989, during the most intense fighting in the country and when a fear of a communist 
take over was greatest.  The United States feared that other communist countries in the 
region, such as Cuba, and the USSR were arming the insurgents.22  As a result, the United 
States elevated its security commitment in El Salvador.   Several examples demonstrate 
the growth of security and weakening of human rights in policy towards El Salvador at 
the time the perceived threat of communist El Salvador was largest. 
 First, in the beginning of the conflict the United States sent 19 military advisors in 
order to supervise, train, and aid in countering the leftist guerrillas.23  As United States 
commitment grew, the Department of Defense raised the number of military advisors 
from 19 to 54 and included experts in combat training.24 Second, in 1983, the United 
States made the distinction between military and paramilitary human rights violations, 
arguing that paramilitary forces, such as the death squads, were right wing extremists.  
The president tried to avert blame from the Salvadoran military and its support for the 
                                                        
22
 Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. . 2010:12. Web site. 
 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41199.pdf  
23
 Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. 19.  
24
 Ibid., 19. 
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death squads,25 in order to protect the military against accusations of human rights 
violations due to the geostrategic importance of upholding the current Salvadoran 
government against the left wing communists.   
 Third, in 1984, the Department of Defense appealed to Congress for more money 
for military aid.26  The Executive Branch argued that the Salvadoran forces were not 
large enough to fight the FMLN.  Therefore, the United States had to raise the amount of 
military funding in order to be able to fight the insurgents better, despite rampant human 
rights violations.  In light of this argument, and due to the recent democratic election in 
the country, Congress raised the amount of funding for the Salvadoran military.27 In this 
example, an improvement in human rights conditions were used to justify the increase in 
funding to support the security driven policies.  In reality, there was a lack of any real or 
substantial human rights improvements on behalf of the Salvadorian military. 
 During the security driven time of the 1980s, human rights concerns were present 
in policy only because they never halted or attempted to curb the U.S. security actions 
and policies in El Salvador at the time.  Any attempt to disturb the security agenda in the 
name of human rights was quickly shut down.  The first example of legislation that 
passed was H.R. 1271, which;  
Amends the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 to 
allow the President to make the fourth certification which is required for 
continuing aid to El Salvador only if the certification includes a determination by 
the President that El Salvador has: made good faith efforts since the last 
                                                        
25
 Burgerman, “First do no harm,” 276. 
26
 Timeline: U.S. policy in el salvador 1980-2000. PBS Web site. 
 http://www.pbs.org/itvs/enemiesofwar/timeline2.html. Accessed September 30,  2012.  
27
 Ibid. 
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certification to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the murders of 
seven U.S. citizens28 
The law sought to ensure that the military aid that the president wanted to give to El 
Salvador had to comply not only with general human rights violations but also more 
specifically with the murder of American citizens.  
 The second piece of legislation passed by Congress was H.R. 4042 in September 
1983.  The law sought to continue the requirements established in the 1981 International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act.  It bought the Congress more time to create 
new legislation pertaining to military aid to El Salvador because it stated that the 1981 
law would continue until Congress created a new law or until September 30, 1984.29  The 
above two initiatives, passed into law because they were not overly aggressive in 
restricting the security driven agenda in El Salvador. 
 Legislation that failed to pass resulted because of the attempt to curb security 
assistance to El Salvador.  The first piece of failed legislation was H.R. 1899, created in 
March 1983.  The document never made it past the subcommittees within the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives.   The bill tried to nullify all military 
assistance to El Salvador unless the president consulted with Congress and submitted a 
report stating that El Salvador had or had not started negotiations.30  A second bill that 
                                                        
28Rep. Gerry Studds. H.R. 1271 (98th): A bill with regard to presidential certifications on 
 conditions in el salvador. Signed by the President. 1983;H.R.1271(98th Congress).  Web 
 site. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1271 
29Barnes M. A bill to continue in effect the current certification requirements with respect to el 
 salvador until the congress enacts new legislation providing conditions for united states 
 military assistance to el salvador or until the end of fisca. Died (At President). 1983;H.R. 
 4042(98th Congress). Web site. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr4042. 
30
 Leach J. A bill to provide that, unless the government of el salvador actively participates 
 in negotiations with all major parties to the conflict which are willing to participate 
 unconditionally in negotiations for the purpose of achieving a cea. Died(Referred to 
 15
was not passed into law was H.R. 2232, created March 1983.  This bill hoped to suspend 
all military aid until there were negotiations between the government and FMLN.31  A 
third document that was not passed was H.J.RES.86 in February 1983.  The resolution 
also attempted to prohibit military assistance to El Salvador.32   
 The difference between the bills that were passed into law and the bills that did 
not make it past committees were that the bills that did not pass were too restrictive on 
the security driven agenda of the United States.  The bills tried to restrict all military aid 
to El Salvador, something that the United States would never have permitted due to the 
geostratigcal importance of El Salvador.  In contrast, the bills that became laws were less 
restrictive.  The laws required congressional oversight of executive actions and required 
reports on El Salvador but did not seek to eliminate military aid.  
 During a time of strictly security driven concerns, the human rights legislation 
that passed into law are important because it marks a period in time when the United 
States attempted to have human rights as part of its policy despite having a security 
driven agenda.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 Committee). 1983;H.R. 1899(98th Congress). Web site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1899 
31
 Feighan E. A bill to suspend military assistance and sales to el salvador until the government 
 of el salvador has demonstrated its willingness, through the appointment of a peace 
 commission, to enter into a dialogue with the other parties to the co. Died(Referred to 
 Committee). 1983;H.R. 2232(98th Congress). Web site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr2232 
32
 Kastenmeier R. A joint resolution to prohibit military assistance for el salvador. 
 Died(Referred to Committee). 1983;H.J.Res. 86(98th Congress). Web site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hjres86  
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Human Rights Reemerge 
 During the entirety of the Salvadorian Civil War, human rights were most present 
at the beginning and end of the conflict.  It appeared at the beginning because the United 
States had not yet completely committed itself to war and it reemerged at the end of the 
conflict as a result of the end of the Cold War.   
 For human rights to have emerged in policy during the early 1980s it could not 
directly interfere with the security policies in El Salvador.  The following examples 
demonstrate the weak but still present influence of human rights in policy towards El 
Salvador.   
 First, in response to the rape of four U.S. churchwomen in 1980, Congress 
initiated H.CON.RES 457.  The resolution stated that military assistance to El Salvador 
should remain suspended until there was proof that the Salvadoran government was not 
associated with the murders.33   It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and met a dead end.  The failed resolution marked the attempt at passing 
legislation influenced by human rights concerns.  Although in this case, human rights 
concerns only emerged because those that died were American.  Because security 
remained a central policy in the early 1980s and the legislation attempted to block 
security policy, the human rights agenda was not passed into law.  
 Second, the Legislative branch made it a requirement of the President to bi-
annually submit a report on El Salvador’s human rights.  In order to receive funding for 
                                                        
33
 Guarini FJ. A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the congress that all military 
 assistance to el salvador should remain suspended until the president of the united states 
 determines that the government of el salvador was not implicat... Died(Referred to 
 Committee). 1980;H.Con.Res. 457(96th).   Web Site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hconres457 
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military assistance, the president would have to certify that El Salvador was attempting to 
improve its human rights record as well as control its own military.34 In addition, the 
Senate passed S.1196, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1981.35  This piece of Senate legislation  
Prohibits the President from consenting to transfers of defense equipment, 
articles, or services whose values exceed such trigger price and whose export has 
been licensed and approved until a specified time after the certification has been 
submitted to Congress.36 
Therefore, the President must receive permission from Congress to send any amount over 
a designated amount established by Congress.  In the late 1970s early 1980s, human 
rights concerns were still present in policy because the United States was not strongly 
committed to El Salvadorian security until later in the war.  Security was beginning to 
dominate policy but human rights concerns were still present in the policy at this time. 
 The late 1980s early 1990s mark the draw down of prioritizing United States 
foreign policy on security in El Salvador for two reasons.  First, the Cold War was 
unraveling and communism became less of a threat to the United States.  Second, the 
1989 Jesuit murders plus the Moakley report aided in ending the priority of security at the 
expense of human rights.   A congressional task force created the Moakley Report in 
order to investigate the murders of the priests.  They found that 9 of the 26 Salvadoran 
officers responsible received military training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas.37  
                                                        
34Burgerman, “First do no harm,” 282. 
35
 Percy C. International security and development cooperation act of 1981. Signed by the 
 President. 1981;S.1196(97th). Web site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/s1196 
36
 Ibid.  
37
 Timeline: U.S. policy in el salvador 1980-2000. PBS 
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The report exemplifies the lack of real human rights policy in the conflict.  The United 
States, despite its rhetoric of supporting human rights, instead bolstered the very regime 
that committed the atrocities.  As a result, the incident was an embarrassment to the 
United States, and instigated immediate Congressional action against military spending.   
The end of the Cold War began a withdrawal of military security concerns but the 
Moakley report sped the end of a security driven agenda. 
 The Legislative branch acted to halt El Salvador’s military aid in several different 
bills.  A joint Congress and Senate Resolution signed by the Senate and passed by the 
President was the H.J.RES.456, titled “Making further continuing appropriations for the 
fiscal year 1992, and for other purposes.”   The resolution restricts the amount of aid 
available to El Salvador to non-lethal supplies.38  While this particular piece of legislation 
passed into law, there were several Congressional failed attempts. 
 The bill H.R.1346 titled, “Peace, Democracy and Development in El Salvador Act 
of 1991”, established three different requirements for El Salvador.  First, it hoped to 
participate in negotiations between the Salvadoran government and FMLN to create a 
cease-fire.  Second, it stated its support of the role of the United Nations.  Third, it 
withheld military assistance, the stationing of US personnel, and financing covert 
operations.39  A second bill, created a few months later, was H.R.3497, “El Salvador 
Peace, Security, and Justice Act of 1991”.  This bill, built on the previous one, sought to 
limit the amount of military aid available to El Salvador.  It stated that no aid would be 
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provided if 1) the Salvadoran government rejected the UN, 2) El Salvador failed to reach 
a cease-fire, 3) El Salvador failed to carry out the UN agreement, and 4) El Salvador did 
not prosecute those responsible for human rights crimes.  The bill also stated it would 
withhold 50% of military aid. 40 Despite not being passed into legislation, 50% of 
military aid was withheld.  Both bills remained within subcommittees in the H.R. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, but mark the attempts of Congress to limit the strictly 
security policy.   
 Not all of the above initiatives were signed into law, but they were still viewed as 
series threats.  In 1991, after the FMLN killed two American advisors, President Bush 
tried to pass $85 million in aid to El Salvador’s military.41  This attempt at raising the aid 
budget occured a few months after the UN started hosting peace agreements.   As a result, 
Congress withheld half the amount.  It withheld half because of past human rights abuses, 
but it also gave the President half because of UN negotiations.   In this example, human 
rights and security concerns resulted in compromise of the policy that was implemented. 
Final Analysis 
 The perception of the importance of security concerns in El Salvador drove 
United States policy.  The major security concern was the fear of a communist take over 
in El Salvador and the domino effect of that result.  Interestingly, through the whole civil 
war, human rights concerns were never abandoned from the agenda.  However, they were 
never implemented in such a way as to truly ensure human rights improvements or limit 
                                                        
40
 Levine M. El salvador peace, security, and justice act of 1991. Died(Referred to Committee). 
 1991;H.R. 3497(102nd). Web site. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr3497 
41
 Knight-Riddle Newspapers. Bush to release military aid to el salvador. The Chicago Tribune. 
January 16 1991. Web site. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-01-
16/news/9101050343_1_el-salvador-six-jesuit-priests-military-aid-package 
 
 20
security.  Instead, at the height of the conflict, human rights improvements were used to 
justify a larger security budget.   
 As security became less of a priority in El Salvador, human rights gained more 
foothold in policy directed towards the country.  The collapse of the USSR also meant the 
collapse of the threat of a communist El Salvador.  Therefore, security became less 
important.   As security became a less important strategy in El Salvador there was less 
emphasis on military assistance as a security objective.  As a result, human rights 
legislation became more prominent in foreign policy directed towards El Salvador. 
 To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated 
human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level.  If this was done, it may 
have been possible to avoid training the forces that committed human rights abuses.  
Suggestions to improve human rights conditions in El Salvador, without hindering the 
security agenda is to implement human rights classes into the military training that the 
Salvadorians receive from the United States.   
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Chapter 3: Indonesia 
 Despite its human rights rhetoric, the United States foreign policy towards 
Indonesia demonstrates the prioritization of security.  Within Indonesia, there are 
instances when both human rights are absent from policy and implemented in security 
driven policy.    
Background Report 
 Secessionist movements in Aceh, El Timor, and Papua were the main areas of 
conflict and human rights abuses in the past and even currently.  In 1999, El Timor was 
allowed to vote for their independence after years of conflict and human rights abuses.   
In 2005, Aceh and Indonesia reached a peace agreement following the devastation of the 
2004 tsunami.  However, Papua remains a region rampant with human rights violations. 
In 1962, the United States, United Nations, and Indonesia gave Papuans’ the opportunity 
for independence under the Act of Free Choice.  The choice was not representative of the 
population because local authority voted to remain under Indonesian control.  In 2003, 
Indonesian President, Megawati, decided to divide Papua into three provinces.  In 2005, 
Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, supported a plan to divide the region further, into five 
provinces.  Thus, ensuring autonomy would be impossible for Papua.42   
 The International Crisis Group declared three specific areas that the Indonesian 
government must address within Papua.43  Firstly, it must expand its political autonomy 
because native Papuans’ are not represented well.  For example, the government created 
the Papuan’s Peoples Council (MRP) but many people do not interpret it as a real 
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representative body because there is no general election.44  Secondly, affirmative action 
within the economic sector must be established for native Papuans.  Employment for the 
natives is difficult due to a preference for Indonesians.45  Lastly, Indonesia must address 
the fear of migration within Papua.  The native Papuans fear the influx of Indonesians 
living within their land and ultimately the destruction of their way of life.46  
Human Rights Violations 
  The State Department notes that Indonesia has made vast improvement within its 
human rights record, though most of the improvements are within Indonesia instead of its 
controversial territories.   For example, the State Departments 2004 Human Rights Report 
states:  
During the year, the Government made further progress in its transition from 3 
decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and 
representative democracy. The country held successful legislative elections and 
free, fair, and peaceful direct presidential elections. Previously, the legislature 
chose the president. The Government further reduced the formal political role of 
the police and military.47        
The Indonesian government became more democratic and the influence of the military 
within the Indonesian government subsided.  Yet, human rights violations remain 
rampant in secessionist areas under Indonesian control.  The same State Department 
report stated that 
Serious problems remained…Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, 
beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements, 
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especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua. The government restricted the 
foreign press from traveling to conflict areas in Aceh, Papua.48                           
There are several categories used to classify types of human rights abuses.  The five main 
ones used to describe the situation within Indonesia are unlawful deprivation of life, 
disappearances, torture, unlawful detention, and press freedoms.  
 It is estimated that 100,000 Papuans have died as a result of the military’s control 
within Papua.49  In El Timor, the estimated number of murders is 200,000 until the peace 
agreement was signed in 1999.50  In addition to murders, there are a large number of 
documented disappearances.  In 2003, there was 130 kidnappings reported. The 
disappearances are mostly within Aceh, whereas Papua has no documented 
disappearances.51  All three secessionists regions have a large number of reported 
tortures.  Within Papua, 256 people were reported tortured in 2003.  Human Rights watch 
reports that an average of 24 out of 35 prisoners within Aceh are tortured.52  El Timor is 
also documented to have used torture in order to extract information and confessions but 
no statistical evidence is documented.53  Within El Timor, Aceh, and Papua there are 
record of people undergoing detention without warrants or court proceedings.  It is 
estimated that 60% of arrests within Papua are made without a warrant.54  There is no 
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reliable data or statistics on the number of arrests without warrants or unlawful holdings 
within El Timor.55   
 All of the above statistical information regarding the human rights abuses within 
El Timor, Aceh, and Papua are not thorough or 100% accurate.  This is due to the fact 
that journalists and NGOs are not allowed into the regions by the Indonesian government.  
Journalists must have permission from the Indonesian government to publish anything, 
and they face police intimidation.56   
Perceived Importance of Indonesia 
 Security is a prioritized policy because of long established, friendly relations with 
the nation and the perceived importance of combating terrorism after the 9/11 terror 
attacks.  As a result, human rights policy, while not ignored, is not at the forefront of 
United States political action in Indonesia.  Several factors contribute to the perceived 
security importance of Indonesia.  
 First, Indonesia is composed of several islands in the East Asian Sea; as a result 
the United States is able to monitor several straits near it.  The Malacca Strait is a key 
waterway connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean along Indonesia’s northern 
border.57   The strait is a major shipping channel connecting the South Asian economies.  
Thus, maintaining the security and freedom of the waterway is vital to American 
economic interests.  In addition to the Malacca Strait, the United States cooperates with 
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Indonesia to police the Makassar Strait and surrounding waters for terrorist and pirate 
activity.58 
 Second, Indonesia is within China’s sphere of influence, and Indonesia has 
expressed concern about its aggressiveness in the region because China is expanding its 
naval capacity.59  As a result, Indonesia is a key military ally of the United States in order 
to balance China’s military power and influence in the region.60  
 Third, Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Indonesia 
was elevated as a security partner of the United States.  Indonesia is composed of the 
world’s largest Muslim population.  As a result, the United States’ partnership with the 
country is two fold.  Firstly, it demonstrates to other Muslim nations that the War on 
Terror is not a war on Muslims.  Secondly, because it is the largest Muslim nation the 
United States fears that poverty may be an area for the growth and influence of Al-
Qaeda.61 For example, there have been several terrorists’ attacks on Indonesian soil as a 
result of Al-Qaeda doctrine.  In 2002, a bomb killed over 200 people at a popular 
nightclub in Bali; in 2003, a car bomb killed 14 in front of a hotel in Jakarta; in 2004, a 
car bomb outside the Australian embassy killed 9; and in 2005, three suicide bombs in 
Bali killed 23.62   Therefore, the United States and Indonesia train together in combating 
terrorism.  
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 Due to the reasons listed above, maintaining a security relationship with Indonesia 
and promoting a United States security agenda remain a policy priority.  Despite 
promoting human rights rhetorically, it falls on the way side of the policy agenda. 
Human Rights Disregarded 
 Due to the perceived importance of maintaining security in Indonesia, the United 
States acted to ensure the prioritization of security driven policy.  There are several 
examples of the United States demonstrating the complete disregard of human rights 
standards.  
 First, the Department of Defense sold military equipment and military parts from 
1992-1997 without congressional knowledge or approval.63  In 1993, nearly $4 million 
dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia.  In the same year, Congress banned 
fighter jets, small arms, and riot control equipment from being sold.64  In 1994, $9.3 
million dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia, including materials for 
manufacturing ammunition, explosives, missiles, and spare aircraft parts.65  
Furthermore, in 1995, $7.3 million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1996, $9.2 
million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1997, %5.1 million dollars worth of 
equipment was sold; in 1998, $10.6 million dollars worth of equipment was sold.66  As a 
result, from 1993 to 1998, a total of $142,480,963 million dollars worth of military 
equipment was sold to Indonesia, despite a Congressional ban on military training and 
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certain military articles.  The above example demonstrates the prioritization of security 
policy because the United States sold military equipment to arm the Indonesians against 
threats and to maintain friendly relations with the country.  The actions were done with 
disregard for the consequences to human rights.  In fact, the weapons sold to Indonesian 
soldiers repressed the individuals in secessionist regions.  
 Second, while IMET was banned, the Department of Defense trained Indonesian 
soldiers under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).  IMET was banned 
following a massacre in El Timor.  From 1992 until 1997, United States and Indonesian 
military personnel underwent joint training every few months for a total of 36 times 
without notifying Congress.67   JCET trained the Kopassus forces, the Indonesian 
Special Forces who notoriously used torture and other extreme methods on civilians in 
secessionist regions.68 Even though the exchange-training program was not illegal, many 
in Congress viewed it as a way to move around the limitations established on IMET.69  
In this example, the United States trained the Indonesian forces that committed human 
rights abuses such as torture in secessionist regions.  Again, despite verbally committing 
itself to international human rights, the United States acts contrarily to its statements.  
 Third, during the War on Terror, the security driven agenda resulted in several 
changes that bolstered the security relationship between Indonesia and the United States.  
The United States provided more funding to train and equip the Indonesians in order to 
fight terrorism and stop it from spreading during the War on Terrorism.  In November 
2005, restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) were waved, allowing for over $6 
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million in foreign aid to go to the Indonesian Navy for maritime security.70 By May, 
restrictions on FMF were lifted even further because the embargo of the sale of non-lethal 
weapons was lifted.71   By 2006, Congress passed a budget allowing $990,000 in sales to 
Indonesia.  In 2007, $6,175,000 was budgeted.  And in 2008, $12,872,000 was 
budgeted.72  In February 2005, restrictions on IMET were lifted.  In addition, Indonesia 
received funding for several other security organizations such as the Antiterrorism 
Assistance Program and the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.73  Despite the 
continuation of human rights abuses in secessionist regions, the United States continued 
to support, train, and arm the Indonesian forces.  
Human Rights Reemerge 
 While never entirely absent from policy in Indonesia, human rights never took the 
forefront of the agenda either.   Human rights concerns became policy in limited cases.  
First, an event occurs, such as a massacre, that cannot be overlooked internationally.  
Second, as long as the human rights policy does not directly interfere with the security 
driven agenda it can become policy.  During the War on Terror there are several 
successful examples of human rights being written into security driven policies.   
  First, human rights can result as reactionary policy.  In 1991, a massacre occurred  
in El Timor that resulted in changed policy. The Indonesian military murdered over 200 
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civilians in the Santa Cruz Massacre.74   The Indonesian military used United States 
M16s to kill the civilians in the massacre.75  As a result, Congress banned IMET from 
1991-1995. 
 Second, human rights concerns are successfully implemented into a security 
driven policy agenda when Congress added additional limitations on IMET.  The 
program was expanding from IMET to E-IMET under H.R. 3121.  Under the law, E-
IMET included classes on human rights for the nations receiving United States training.76  
The law states that IMET was resumed with human rights clauses because of “the 
importance of Indonesia as a trade and security partner, on professionalism and human 
rights sensitivity of the foreign military beneficiaries”.77  Within this law, Congress 
recognizes the security importance of Indonesia in addition to the importance of 
international human rights.  Therefore, human rights and security were efficiently 
compromised under H.R.3121 because IMET was resumed in order to bolster United 
States security but with human rights concerns.  For example, the law states that 
This limited restoration of IMET, therefore, should not be interpreted as an 
expression of congressional satisfaction with the Government of Indonesia's 
human rights performance in East Timor or elsewhere in Indonesia. The Congress 
remains concerned about poor human rights conditions in Indonesia and urges the 
Administration to actively promote better human rights practices. Moreover, the 
Congress looks for improvements in these areas prior to restoration of the full 
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range of security cooperation with Indonesia, as it existed prior to the massacre in 
Deli, East Timor, in November 1991.78 
Congress states that it is not fully satisfied with human rights conditions in Indonesia but 
understands the importance of maintaining a security partnership with the country 
through arms sale and joint training.  Therefore, Congress improved the Department of 
Defense’s training program to include human rights classes.  In this example, human 
rights policy is successfully implemented along with security policy in Indonesia.  
 Human rights and security policies can coexist, but human rights policies are not 
implemented if they disrupt security rather than work with it.  There are several bills that 
met their end within committees of the House of Representatives as a result of this. 
 Two bills that died within Congress that tried to limit the powers of the executive 
due to human rights violations are H.R.1063 and H.R. 3918.  H.R. 1063, International 
Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act, was initiated by the 106th 
congress in 1999.  The bill attempted to “prohibit the sale of weapons and training to any 
foreign country that is not allowed to receive international training or arms sale”.79  The 
second bill that failed to pass into law was H.R. 3918, Indonesia Human Rights Before 
Military Assistance Act.  The bill sought to restrict the sale of lethal military equipment, 
helicopters, building materials, ammunition, and parts to Indonesia unless the president 
certified that the Indonesian government was improving its human rights record. 80   
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 In order for human rights to successfully become part of a security driven agenda, 
it must not limit arms sales and training programs.  For example, in 2006, H.R. 3057: 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, was signed into law.  The 
law required that no less than $1,000,000 be available for Indonesia to enhance security.  
The law specifically includes that the countries that receive aid must be “consistent with 
the democratic principles and rule of law”.81  Even though security remains a primary 
objective in the bill, it also ensures clauses respecting human rights values are stated.  
Even though the law does not primarily concern itself with human rights, undertones of 
the objective are written into the security-concerned law.  For example, the law states that 
the President can “issue licenses for the export of lethal equipment only if the secretary of 
state confirms that the Indonesian government is prosecuting soldiers for human rights 
violations”.82   In addition, the law states that the Secretary of State must report to 
Congress on the status of Indonesian prosecutions for human rights abuses.83  In this 
example, Congress implements human rights policy in a more subtle way, such as 
requiring reports on the country and linking the sale of lethal military supplies to military 
tribunals.   
 Final Analysis 
 The perception of the importance of security concerns in Indonesia drive United 
States policy.  The major security concern was maintaining a U.S. presence in a strategic 
region and containing terrorism particularly during the War on Terror. There are 
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instances in policy where human rights are completely absent and when human rights are 
present.  But, whether human rights are absent or present from policy, security remains 
the priority of the United States in Indonesia.   
 To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated 
human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level.  If this was done, it may 
have been possible to avoid training and arming the security forces committing human 
rights abuses in Indonesia.   A suggestion to improve human rights conditions in 
Indonesia, without hindering the security agenda, is to have restricted military sales of 
non-lethal materials.   In this example, equipment is still sold to Indonesia, but not 
harmful material that could have been used to repress people in secessionist regions.  An 
example of human rights and security concerns implemented into coherent policy was the 
transition from IMET to E-IMET.    
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Chapter 4: Bahrain 
 In light of the Arab Spring and United States’ promises towards its commitment 
to human rights, U.S. relations with Bahrain demonstrates the prioritization of security 
concerns over human rights.  In particular, during the War on Terror, security concerns 
take precedence over human rights due to the perceived importance of security in war.  
The United States pursued its military relations and sales with Bahrain despite the 
country’s disregard for its citizens’ human rights.  As war ended, human rights crept back 
into United States foreign policy because of changing priorities. Security remains the 
central factor of policy creation in Bahrain, but human rights concerns are also present.  
Background Report 
 The small Sunni population controls most of the economic wealth and political 
representation in the majority Shi’a nation of Bahrain.  As a result, the Shi’a majority is 
underrepresented in the government and does not receive the same economic 
opportunities as the Sunni population.  The problems of Bahrain lingered under the 
surface of the country for years until the Arab Spring catalyzed the situation and brought 
the strife into the forefront of Bahraini politics.  The Shi’a demands during the Arab 
Spring were threefold: alter the constitution to give more power to the parliament, end 
gerrymandering, and provide more equal economic opportunities.84 
 The Arab Revolt reached Bahrain February 17, 2011.  Sleeping demonstrators 
were awoken by tear gas and rubber bullets.  Four people were killed on the first day of 
the protests at the Pearl Roundabout.  On February 18, directly following the police 
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actions, the protests grew larger.  On February 19, security forces pulled away from 
confronting protestors in response to United States’ urging.  On February 22, the crown 
prince tried to initiate a formal dialogue to resolve the protestors’ demands.  After 
protestors reached the financial district of the country on March 13, Bahrain appealed to 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  In response, Saudi Arabia sent 1,200 forces and 20 
tanks.  The United Arab Emirates sent 600 police.  The influx of foreign troops 
represented an overwhelming show of force against civilian populations.  By June 29, the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) created a set of recommendations to 
help resolve the conflict and restore peace in the country.  The Shi’a majority rejected the 
initiative because parliament did not have full authority but was praised by the United 
States as a step in the right direction.  By November 26, King Hamad established a 
government commission to enact BICI’s recommendations, which failed to stop the 
protests.85   
Human Rights Violations 
 The government’s mishandling of the protests received international attention and 
brought the issues of human rights to the forefront of the conflict.  Over the course of the 
protests, 52 were confirmed dead.  Five died from torture techniques such as beating, 
cables, whips, electrocution, sleep-deprivation, and temperature exposure. Over 1,800 
people were detained without warrants, held without hearings, and denied trials.  In 
addition, police threatened detainees and their families with rape and murder.  Bahraini 
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security forces detained kids under fifteen and destroyed 30 Shi’a mosques.86  
Additionally, the media and NGOs’ access to the nation during the Arab Spring were 
severely limited.  In summary, Bahrain’s list of human rights abuses include unlawful 
deprivation of life, torture, unlawful detention, and media repression. 
Importance of Bahrain to the United States 
 Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of the 
relationship between Bahrain and the United States.  Bahrain is a key geostrategic ally of 
the United States for three major reasons.  First, it is located in the middle of the Arabian 
Gulf across from Iran.  The United States ensures that shipping remains open for vital 
economic trade in oil and other resources.87  Bahrain’s key location leads to the second 
reason it is an important ally to the United States.  The small country hosts the American 
Navy’s 5th fleet, which is composed of 30 warships and over 30,000 sailors.88  Bahrain is 
a major logistical center, rest stop, and resupply zone of the United States military 
operating in the Gulf region and the Middle East.  The United States also conducts joint 
training with the Bahraini military.  Bahraini defense forces send their personnel to the 
United States for training in addition to purchasing American weapons.  In the past 
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decade, military sales have reached nearly $1.5 billion.89   Third, after 9/11, Bahrain 
became a major non-NATO ally in the War on Terror for its military partnership as well 
as its logistical capacity.  The relationship has been in place since the first Gulf War with 
Iraq in 1991.  The United States and Bahrain’s combined task force interdicts weapons of 
mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics in the Arabian Sea.90  In addition, Bahrain runs 
support missions for the United States forces acting in Afghanistan.  As a result of this 
military relationship and Bahrain’s status as a key ally of the United States, security 
concerns dominate foreign policy  
Human Rights Disregarded 
  Due to the perceived security importance of Bahrain to the United States, the 
U.S. has acted in ways to ensure the continuation of a security driven agenda.  This is 
especially true during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Three examples of the 
prioritization of security are examined below. 
 First, Bahrain received additional money for various security programs in Bahrain 
after the terrorist attacks on the United States.  For example, between 2002-2004 the 
United States provided $143.1 million for the Foreign Military Fund and $1.442 trillion 
for IMET.91 The United States offers a lot of security assistance to the tiny island nation, 
but the United States receives several security benefits from the relationship.  For 
example Bahrain “provided extensive basing and over flight clearances for a multitude of 
U.S. aircraft operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
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Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Bahrain also deployed forces in support of the Coalition”.92 Bahrain 
hosted 4,000 troops for OEF and 4,500 troops for OIF.93   
 Second, the Defense Cooperation Pact was created during the first Gulf War and 
allows for the 5th fleets presence in the country.  It is re-signed every 10 years.  The pact 
was re-signed in 2001 but five years additional years were added to the program. As a 
result its new signing date is October 2016 instead of 2011.94  American security and the 
retention of a key ally within the Gulf drove the president to add the additional years to 
the defense pact.     
 Third, there is no legislation criticizing Bahrain or condemning human rights 
abuses and lack of equality among the Sunni and Shi’a.  For example, in 2003 Congress 
wrote H.CON.RES.211.  The resolution expresses gratitude for Bahrain and other gulf 
countries for their support in Operation Iraqi Freedom.95  Another example of Congress 
expressing thanks and friendliness to Bahrain is in H.CON.RES 31: Welcoming His 
Majesty Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Kalifa, King of the Kingdom of Bahrain, on his visit to 
the United States in February 2003.  Like the other resolution, this document also 
commends Bahrain for its support in the wars and its support for the relationship between 
Bahrain and the United States.96  Both these resolutions thank Bahrain for the security 
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relationship the two countries have at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It 
was not until later that Congress took a different tone after much of the fighting in Iraq 
had passed and the war became unpopular. 
Human Rights Reemerge  
 Human rights began to etch its way into policy at the draw down of the Iraq War 
as a result of the changing priorities of the United States policies in Bahrain.  Strictly 
military security concerns were deemphasized at the draw down of war and human rights 
concerns reemerged. 
 The War on Terror was the reason for the narrowly focused security driven policy 
in the early 2000s but in the late 2000s security remained a priority because the United 
States feared the fall of Sheikh Hamad.  The U.S. feared the rise of a Shi’a government 
that would be more perceptible to Iran’s influences and less friendly to the United States.  
It poses a threat to the United States influence in the region and possibility of severing the 
Defense Cooperation Pact with Bahrain.97  As a result, security remains central to United 
States policy in Bahrain but human rights have reemerged in policy as well.  
 In 2008, a bill was introduced in the Senate that sought to re-introduce the issue of 
human rights into the strictly security driven policy towards Bahrain.  The resolution 
S.RES.619 is titled “Resolution expressing support for a constructive dialogue on human 
rights issues between the United States and Bahrain”.98  The Senate calls on the President 
as well as the Secretary of State to jumpstart the dialogue between Bahrain and the 
United States about human rights issues in the country.  The resolution died within the 
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Committee on Foreign Relations and was never passed into law or signed by the 
President.  It was not until the Arab Spring and increased international media attention 
that Congress acted more aggressively in limiting the security driven policy towards 
Bahrain.  
  When the Arab Spring started in Bahrain, the Department of Defense tried to 
pass an arms sales bill through Congress.  On September 14, 2011, the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible military sale to Bahrain. 99   The 
United States wanted to sell 44 armored vehicles and hundreds of TOW missiles. The 
sale was worth $53 million dollars and announced only seven months after the initial start 
of the conflict.100   The arms sale was to be used only to defend against outside threats 
and thus it did not breech the Leahy Amendment, which states that the United States 
cannot sell military equipment that is used against the receiving nation’s own citizens.  
Thus, the loophole in the amendment made the arms sale possible.  In this example, the 
Leahy Amendment ensures that security is not met at the cost of human rights in foreign 
policy.  It represents an important piece of legislation that tries to balance security and 
human rights in foreign policy.   
 In response to the proposed arm sale, Congress tried to initiate H.J.RES.80, which 
states that the proposed arms sale to Bahrain is prohibited due to human rights abuses 
unless the Secretary of State certifies five things: 1) Bahrain is conducting investigations 
and prosecutions of those responsible for torture and mishandling of protestors,              
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2) Bahrain is no longer torturing its citizens, 3) Bahrain is rebuilding destroyed mosques, 
4) Bahrain lifts government employment restrictions based on religion, and 5) Bahrain 
implements BICI.101  The bill was introduced in 2011 and has not been passed by the 
House of Representatives, Senate, or President.   Another resolution, not signed into law, 
is S.J.RES.28, which reaffirms the forementioned legislation to limit the sale of certain 
defense items to Bahrain.102   
 The legislation may not have passed, but a Congressional letter sent to Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton by the Senate received feedback.   The letter, written on October 
12, 2011, stated that the proposed military sale would weaken American credibility.  The 
letter stated that: 
Completing an arms sale to Bahrain under the current circumstances would 
weaken U.S. credibility at a critical time of democratic transition in the Middle 
East. We urge you to send a strong signal that the United States does not condone 
the repression of peaceful demonstrators by delaying the possible arms sale until 
the Bahraini government releases its political prisoners, addresses the independent 
commission’s recommendations, and enters into meaningful dialogue with 
Bahraini civil society and opposition groups.103 
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 While the letter may not have been the cause of halting the arms sale, it serves as an 
example of human rights concerns shaping policy implementation.104  
 The Legislative Branch only found temporary success in halting the Executive 
Office’s initial military arms sale.  The initial $53 million plan was unsuccessful, but a 
loophole in the law allowed for the President to send military sales under $1 million 
without notifying Congress.  Additionally, the administration can divide each individual 
sale to ensure it is below the $1 million dollar mark to ensure Congress cannot block the 
deal.105  In this example, human rights and security are important policies of the United 
States instead of one over the other.  As a result, human rights concerns became policy 
through the Congressional blocking of the initial military arms deal.  However, because 
military security remains an important priority of the United States, the arms deal is 
restructured and implemented differently.  The two policies may appear to butt heads but 
the importance of the example is that human rights concerns and security concerns are 
both implemented in United States foreign policy. 
 The BICI report was officially released in March 2012, one month later, the 
United States re-initiated its initial arms sale with modifications.  In this example, human 
rights and security concerns are both elements of the United States policy toward 
Bahrain.  The BICI report is an important indicator of human rights accountability and 
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progress.  As a result, security driven arms sales are implemented.  Lethal materials such 
as TOW missiles, Humvees, tear gas, and other similar items that could be used against 
protestors would not be sold.  But materials for harbor security vessels and F-16s were 
among the items sold to Bahrain.  The State Department released a statement that they 
have “made this decision mindful of the fact that there remain a number of serious, 
unresolved human rights issues in Bahrain, which we expect the government of Bahrain 
to address.”106  In response to the arms sale, Congress initiated its own statement that it 
was pleased that lethal materials were being withheld but worried that the arms sale 
would send a wrong message to Bahrain.107  The implementation of both security and 
human rights policies may not have resulted in perfectly streamlined policy but at least 
the policy was implemented with regards to human rights.  As a result, United States 
policy is less inconsistent with its National Security Strategy and own established values.  
Final Analysis 
 The perception of the importance of security concerns in Bahrain drove United 
States policy.  During a time of war, security was perceived as more important than 
human rights.  The major security concern in Bahrain was bolstering a nation friendly to 
the United States in the Gulf region, especially when the major threat in the region for the 
U.S. is Iran.  Human rights reemerged in policy after the Iraq war, but was never at the 
forefront of the policy agenda.  In fact, human rights policy was often implemented only 
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if loopholes were in the policy that allowed for the prioritization of security. For example, 
the large arm sale was halted due to human rights abuses, but still allowed for small 
military sales to continue.  Human rights and security remain conflictual policies in 
Bahrain. 
 Therefore, to ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have 
evaluated human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level.  If this was 
done, it may have been possible to avoid a policy tug of war between security and human 
rights.  The example of limiting arms sales due to human rights, is the closest that human 
rights comes to being on equal footing with security concerns.  
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Chapter 5: Summary of Content 
 The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not consistently in its 
actions in the case studies of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain.   The reason for this is 
because security is prioritized over human rights.   Once security is ensured, then human 
rights are included in policy.  Although there are few cases when human rights and 
security objectives are both written into coherent policy, it is inconsistent.  The United 
States must consistently ensure human rights and security rhetoric are practiced in policy 
rather than security over human rights.  
 Following the constructivist theory of international relations, the United States 
prioritizes security over human rights in policy because it perceives security as pivotal to 
its existence.  Social factors mold the priorities of the United States, and when those 
factors change so do the priorities. 
 In El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over 
human rights due to the social factors that drove the securitization of policy.  
Nonetheless, each case contains elements of when human rights and security are both 
written into policy.  The inclusion of human rights in security policy remains inconsistent 
in each case study but represents a starting point to create more consistent policy.  
 In El Salvador, the United States privileged security over human rights and even 
bolstered the Salvadorian military that committed human rights abuses.  The reason for 
this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the 
importance of combating communism in Latin America.  A social factor that contributed 
to the perception of prioritizing security was the Cold War against Russia and the spread 
of communism.    
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 Within El Salvador, human rights were either absent from policy or emerged 
towards the end of the conflict.  During the height of the Civil War during the 1980s, the 
United States consistently prioritized security over human rights.  The United States 
defended the Salvadorian military against accusations of human rights abuse and 
continued to train and arm them.  Additionally, the Department of Defense used human 
rights as an argument for increasing security spending in El Salvador.  A democratic 
election in El Salvador was justified as an improvement in human rights and therefore 
military spending increased despite a lack of real human rights improvement on behalf of 
the Salvadorian military.   Human rights reemerged in foreign policy towards the end of 
the conflict because of changing social factors.  The Cold War was near an end and the 
threat from USSR subsided.  Therefore, the security driven agenda also changed and 
human rights were considered in policy decisions.   For example, in 1992, a law passed 
stating that any military aid sent to El Salvador was restricted to non-lethal supplies.   
Therefore, in El Salvador security was prioritized during the height of the Civil War.  As 
the Cold War ended, so did the securitization of policy in El Salvador and human rights 
concerns were written in policy.  
 In Indonesia, the United States prioritized security over human rights and again 
bolstered the Indonesian military that committed human rights abuses.  The reason for 
this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the 
importance of maintaining influence and a presence in South Asia.   A social factor that 
contributes to the perception of prioritizing security is maintaining a relationship with 
Indonesia in order to balance the regional hegemon, China.   After the attack on the 
United States’ World Trade Center, another social factor that contributed to the 
 46
prioritization of security policy was the War on Terrorism.  Indonesia became a partner in 
combating and preventing the spread of terrorism.   
  United States policy is contradictory in Indonesia because there are cases in 
which human rights concerns are overlooked and there are cases in which human rights 
are successfully integrated within security policy.  Human rights were not considered in 
policy when the Department of Defense sold military equipment totaling $142 million 
that was used against civilians in the secessionist region.  The military sales occurred 
after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991, when United States M16s were used against 
people in El Timor.   Another example occured under JCET, in which the United States 
trained the Indonesian Special Forces who were known for committing human rights 
atrocities.   However, there are examples of the successful implementation of human 
rights policy within the context security policy.   The most successful model is the 
transition from IMET to E-IMET.   In this example, education about human rights were 
added to the military training program for Indonesian soldiers.   Therefore, in Indonesia 
security was and is prioritized but there are limited cases when human rights concerns are 
written into security driven policy.   
 In Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over human rights but did not 
bolster the Bahraini military during the Arab Spring.  The reason the United States 
prioritized security in Bahrain is due to the perception of the importance of maintaining 
influence and a presence in the region.  Social factors that contribute to the prioritization 
of security are balancing Iran’s influence in the region, ensuring the waterways remain 
open for economic reasons, and ensuring the continuation of U.S. military privileges in 
the country.  
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 Within Bahrain, human rights were absent from policy at the height of the war in 
Iraq but reemerged during the Arab Spring.  During wartime, the United States provided 
$143 million for FMF and $1 trillion for IMET training despite that during this time there 
was never fair or equal representation of all peoples within the government of Bahrain.   
Instead, in 2003, the United States commended the security relationship with Bahrain and 
thanked the country for its support in U.S. wars.   Towards the end of the war the strictly 
security driven policies diminished and human rights reemerged.  For example, at the 
start of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Department of Defense tried to pass a large military 
sales initiative to Bahrain.  However, due to human rights concerns, the initiative did not 
pass.  In response, the Department of Defense kept military sales under $1 million dollars 
each until human rights conditions improved.  Once conditions improved the arms sale 
occurred with the exception that lethal materials were not sold.  In this example, human 
rights appears to have conflicted with security policy. Despite this, human rights concerns 
resulted in altered security policy.  Security remains the prioritized policy in Bahrain, but 
elements of human rights policy emerge in Bahrain.  
 In summary, all three cases contain conflictual policy that include human rights 
rhetoric and security-implemented policy.  However, in all three cases, human rights 
policy emerge under different conditions.  United States perception of the prioritization 
of security must change to further include human rights.  Human rights must be written 
into security driven policy to ensure that human rights rhetoric matches United States 
foreign policy and actions abroad. The following chapter provides a series of 
recommendations to embed human rights concerns into security policy.  
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Chapter 6: Concluding Recommendations 
 
 Security remains a central policy of the United States.  But the notion of 
sacrificing human rights objectives for security is false.  Both foreign policy goals can 
co-exist together and even bolster each other when approached and utilized correctly.    
Therefore, this final chapter seeks to create a set of recommendations to improve the 
future of American foreign policy in hopes of preventing such conflictual policies of the 
past.  
Key Findings 
 The following findings from the case studies highlighted in the previous chapter 
form the basis for the policy recommendation.  
1) Ever since human rights have risen in importance to the United States, America has 
engaged in controversial actions in the name of security at the cost of human rights.  In 
El Salvador, the fear of a communist takeover in the region influenced the United States 
to support a corrupt government and its military at the cost of thousands of civilian 
lives.  In Indonesia, U.S. military partnership with the country has benefited the United 
States greatly, but many people in secessionist regions have struggled under the 
Indonesian military.  The U.S.-Bahraini military partnership again benefits both 
countries but the Shi’a population suffered from an unfair governmental system even 
before the Arab Spring.   Therefore, American foreign policy goals must be rectified to 
ensure human rights do not suffer while promoting security goals.  
2) There are cases in El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain in which human rights policy is 
successfully implemented in a security driven agenda.  In El Salvador, human rights 
were written into policy at the end of the conflict when security was no longer a priority 
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due to the end of the Cold War.  Military funding was suspended near the end of the 
conflict in light of the Moakley report.  In Bahrain, human rights were written into 
policy again at the end of conflict.  In this case, the end of the Iraq war marked the 
reemergence of human rights into policy.  The Leahy Amendment ensured that security 
through an arms sale was not achieved at the expense of human rights during the Arab 
Spring.  In Indonesia, human rights were written into security driven policy 
inconsistently.  However, when written into policy, human rights did not disrupt the 
security agenda.  Instead, it worked with it perfectly to ensure human rights and 
security concerns were met.  These examples from the case studies are what the United 
States must build off to create more consistent foreign policy.  
Alternative Policies Considered and Rejected 
 The following are options of the United States that should not become policy for 
various reasons highlighted below. 
1) Maintain the Status Quo:  As highlighted throughout American history, prioritizing 
security has heavy costs to the objective of human rights.   Therefore, maintaining the 
status quo is not the answer.  Instead, the United States should seek a balanced approach 
that emphasizes that both security and respect for human rights are equally important in 
the international setting,  
2) Disregarding Human Rights:  Removing the promotion of human rights as an 
international political agenda would weaken United States authority abroad.  The United 
States values human rights domestically.  The United States must project those value 
abroad and act according to its values. 
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A Balanced Approach 
 A better approach focuses on creating a balance between promoting security and 
human rights as foreign policy goals.   States that are American partners enjoy many 
benefits of friendships such as security-based alliances.  However, within such a 
relationship an element of human rights respect must also be promoted.    A key 
component of the strategy is to ensure that elements of human rights concerns are written 
into security driven policies.  Therefore, human rights concerns do not necessarily 
obstruct security driven policy but instead works cohesively within it.  Therefore, United 
States policies can be less conflictual and inconsistent. 
Advantaged 
 The following are the advantages of the proposed strategy.  
1) The policy demonstrates American leadership, values, and ideology abroad.  The United 
States is a superpower internationally.  Because it is a nation that strongly believes in its 
own value system, including universal human rights, it has the potential to be the leader 
in promoting these universal values.  But it can only do so by not being hypocritical by 
supporting human rights sometimes and security other times.  
2) The policy does not contradict the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.  The 
United States is a key leader within the United Nations.  Therefore, complying with the 
standards established within the UN document does not tarnish the perception of our 
leadership internationally.  Focusing on security, at the expense of human rights, often 
promotes corrupt leadership and action that is condoned in the document.  Therefore, 
ensuring that respect for human rights is met within security driven agendas does not 
contradict the international standard of human rights.  
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Key Policy Recommendation 
 Embedding elements of human rights concerns within security establishments will 
involve interagency cooperation.  Based on the recommendations above, the following 
are key policy recommendations.  
1) Department of Defense:  As one of the largest Executive Departments, the DoD is 
responsible for all components of the military and international military programs.  
IMET is an example of a security driven training tool for partner nations that is funded 
by the State Department.  When the program became E-IMET, human rights training 
initiatives were included.  More programs that include human rights elements in foreign 
training must be included in DoD programs to ensure the governments the United 
States is supporting receive training in complying with and understanding the universal 
human rights norms.  
2) The National Security Council: The key members of the National Security Council are 
the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
the Secretary of Defense.108 Therefore, it is important to include an element in this 
council that focuses its resources on human rights, specifically the effects of human 
rights in states supported by the United States or that receive military funding. 
3) State Department:  The mission statement of the Department of States is to “create a 
more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people 
and the international community.”109  Therefore, the department must cooperate more 
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with the Department of Defense in implementing and creating security driven policies 
with respect for human rights.  E-IMET, is the perfect example but must be 
implemented on an even larger scale under different programs.  
• USAID:  The cooperation between USAID and DoD can create a strong foundation 
for security partnerships that respect and promote human rights.  USAID is 
currently promoting good governance as a tool to bolster human rights through anti-
corruption, reform, legislative strengthening, decentralization, public management, 
and security sector reform.110    
Concluding Thoughts 
 The recommended policy is based on a firm belief in the importance of promoting 
human rights.  Developing policy with human rights elements will be difficult due to the 
securitization of United States foreign policy.  Therefore, the United States must change 
its perception of the foreign policy priorities in order to embed human rights concerns 
into security policy.  Hopefully, such changes will ensure that the United States does not 
bolster human rights abusers or ignore human rights in its partner nations such as the 
cases of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain.  
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